I picked up this book at an airport and figured it would be a good read. I wasn't disappointed, but one thing that did surprise me was that this book was written back in 1981. I did not pay enough attention to that fact prior to buying the book, but it took little away from the book, while adding the unappreciated fact that the author many times when referring to Eisenhower would actually refer to conversations he himself had with the former President and General. That kind of closeness and intimacy is rare when reading a historical account of events which transpired more than fifty years ago, but added considerably to my enjoyment of the book.
With that said, the general overview of the book is one of a look of the early birth of professional intelligence gathering organizations in America from the viewpoint of Dwight D. Eisenhower's involvement with it. The book gives an early positive portrayal of Eisenhower as he arrives in London to meet with Winston Churchill and to be formally read in a program being run by the British known as "Ultra." The British had broken the cipher the Germans were used in their cable traffic and were able to read all message traffic being sent from German head quarters to their military units. Ultra was obviously a huge advantage to which the British and American counterparts used to receive advanced warning of German movements as well as to gage how successful their deception campaigns against the Germans were going.
From this early introduction Eisenhower learned the importance of consistently intercepted and correctly translated signals from the enemy. He would also learn the value of traditional espionage using spies when he learned from the British that they are intercepted and turned all Nazi spies which had been sent to Britain. This coup allowed the British to deceive their German counterparts by feeding them false information time and time again.
Throughout the war General Eisenhower would receive daily intelligence updates from a British General, Kenneth Strong. Strong kept Eisenhower informed on enemy movements, their dispositions, and the prediction on what further defensive measures they would take. From this Eisenhower learned the importance of timely and accurate information.
One interesting point I'd like to make about this book while it described American intelligence activities during these years is that this is probably the book that has been the most critical of the OSS activities during this period, and of William Donovan in particular. While it is generally accepted that OSS was little more than a bunch of amateurs who made little difference in the overall war effort, Ambrose paints Donovan as a person who played to the favor of sycophants rather than to the duty the war demanded.
Following the war, Eisenhower appears to have been content to retire, but eventually returned to run for President. The interesting point Ambrose makes in Eisenhower's decision to run is in how he says the Republican Party convinced him to run. It was through appealing to Eisenhower's sense of duty to his country. Republican Party officials reportedly stated to Eisenhower if he did not run they did not believe they could beat the Democrats, and without a Republican victory they believed it would effectively end the two party system in America. With that said Eisenhower made his decision and came out of retirement and won the election in 1952.
While President Eisenhower allowed the CIA to grow and flourish, enjoying a time described as the golden years of the CIA. Early on the CIA enjoyed success toppling governments in Guatemala and Iran. The author makes the case though, that this early success were against weak governments and unfortunately gave the CIA a sense of ability which was not really there. The author later linked this belief in their own ability to the failure commonly known as the bay of Pigs.
In planning for the overthrow of Fidel Castro the CIA had pitched an idea which involved the establishment of a Cuban government in exile, a trained military force to invade Cuba, and the establishment of support groups within Cuba itself to help with the invasion. Eisenhower approved of the idea and the CIA was able to move ahead with the training, however all searches for a suitable Cuban alternate to Castro produced no results. As to building support networks in Cuba, Castro's forces had the island so well blocked off from the outside world it was virtually impossible to establish anything prior to the approved invasion. Still, Eisenhower maintained that the trained Cuban forces would only be used if there was a Cuban government in exile which could be put in power immediately following Castro's removal from office. When JFK came into office they believed the CIA had planned all along to move ahead with this force and based off of Eisenhower's legitimacy they moved forward. The invasion was a disaster ans so ended the so called golden years for the CIA.
In the end, Eisenhower helped take an organization that had only been in existence a few years and allowed it to grow and flourish. After Eisenhower left office the CIA had a firm base from which to grow and to win the fight in the cold war.
-Zach
